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SARENDIB'S SORROW: SRI LANKA'S CONTINUING CONFLICT
Abhayraj Naik*
In this article, the author studies the conflict in Sri Lanka, and
identifies and describes two sources of its intractability:fracturedfronts
and maximalist goals. The artile seeks to reveal that while the Sri
Lankan governments recent military onslaught against the LTTE
has been surprisingly successful, history is clear that a meaningful
solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka will be found not on the battlefield
but in the hearts and minds of the Sri Lankan people. The causes of
the conflict are several - an analysis of these sources of intractabily
involves both a backwardlooking appreciationofthe events, perspectives
and trends that fractured a nation as well as a forward looking
transformative outlook towards a shared deliberative reality. The
authorbelieves that while the currentmilitary success againstthe LTTE
coinddes with a wave of collective Sri Lankan anguish at the country'
grimpredicament.Forseveral reasons, thepresent represents apotential
moment of critical realignment in Sri Lanka. An analysis of the
institutional,historical and ideological bases of the conflict indicates
dfferent channels that the public sphere will have to simultaneously
destroy and create if such a criticalrealignment is to be serendipitousy
realised.

*

B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore (2006); LL.M.,
Yale Law School, New Haven (2008).
I am grateful to Mr. Sitharam Kakarala for encouraging me to begin work on this
topic in 2002-03. Most of the research for this paper was carried out at the
International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), Colombo in 2003 and 2005. I am
grateful to ICES, Colombo for use of their research facilities. I would also like to
thank the editors and an anonymous reviewer of the Socio-LEGAL REVIEW for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The responsibility for all views and
errors herein remains mine.
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Serendib and TaprobaneWords as argent-chimed as rain,
Words like little golden beads,
Apple and pomegranate seeds,
Strung upon a silver thread,
Little drops of lacquer-red,
Tintinnabular and sweet,
Little words with crystal feet
Running lightly through my mind.
If my lazy wit could find
Gilded phrases to express
Their perfected loveliness,
I would make a cage of words
Where, like bright heraldic birds,
They should strut and flaunt and preen,
Scarlet, silver, gold and green,
Elegantly strange and vain Serendip and Taprobane.
-

Anne Atwood Dodge, "Serendip and Taprobane", Harper's(August 1927), p. 272.
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Introduction
Horace Walpole, the 4' Earl of Orford (24 September 1717 - 2 March
1797) coined the word 'serendipity' in one of his numerous letters, and credited
the derivation to a 'silly fairy tale' that he had read - The Travels and Adventures
of Three Princes of Sarendip.' The three princes of the title are the sons of Jaffer,

the philosopher-king of Sarendip (or Serendib or Serendippo - which, along
with Taprobane and Ceylon - was an ancient name for what is today known as
Sri Lanka).2 The word serendipity connotes a quality, discovery or turn of events
that is good, unexpected and the result of a particular combination of sagacity
and luck. Given the devastating conflict that has been raging across Sri Lanka
for a quarter century now, 'serendipity' seems to be particularly inappropriate to
describe the condition of the country from which the word originates.'
The intractability and complexity of the conflict has lead RajasinghamSenanayake to call Sri Lanka, at the close of a century of decolonisation, as

Letter from Horace Walpole to Horace Mann (28 Jan. 1754), in 4 THE YALE EDITION
OF HORACE WALPOLE'S CORRESPONDENCE 407 (WS. Lewis et al. eds., 1960).
Robert K Merton points out that this fairy tale first appeared in sixteenth-century
Venice under the title Peregrinaggiodi tre giovani,figliuoli del re di Serendpo, tradatto dalla
lingua persiana in lingua italiana de M. Christoforo Armeno, which was translated into

English (via a French intermediary) only in 1722 under the title Travels andAdventures

2

3

of Three Princes of Serendip. See Robert K Merton, Preface, in ROBERT K. MERTON &
ELINOR BARBER, THE TRAvELS AND ADVENTURES OF SERENDIPITY (2004).
MERTON & BARBER, id. at 2.

Lee Kuan Yew (widely acclaimed as the architect of modern Singapore) represents a
much respected figure in the Sri Lankan political milieu, and his memoir impressions
on Sri Lanka are worth excerpting from .here: 'It is sad that the county whose andent
name Serendp has given the English language the word "serendipity' is now the epitome of
conflct, pain, sorrow and hopelessness.' See LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST:
THE SINGAPORE STORY: 1965-2000 (2000), quoted in Rajeev Amarasuriya, Lee Kuan
Yew' impressions of Sri Lanka, SUNDAY OBSERVER, Aug. 31, 2003, available at http://
www.sundayobserver.lk/2003/08/31/feal4.html.
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South Asia's 'most dramatic failure at modern nation-building.'4 The bestial
metaphors of the war - lion versus tiger - are particularly illustrative of the
ferocity of the conflict.' The apotheosis of the idea of a failed and conflict-torn
Sri Lanka/Sarendib is, however, afailure of the imagination.' My emphasis upon
'Sarendib' and 'serendipity' throughout this paper reflects both a deliberate
historical dredging up of the word's connexion with Sri Lanka's glorious past,'

Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Democray and the Problem of Representaton:The Making
of Bi-polar Ethnic Identity in Post/ColonialSi Lanka, in ETHNIC FUTURES - THE STATE
AND IDENTITY POLITICS IN AsIA 99 (Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka et al. eds., 1999).
s

6

Jeyaraj points out: Mythological history traces Sinhalese origins to Prince Vijaya who
in turn is believed to have had a leonine ancestor. Sinhaya is the Sinhala word for
"lion" and the Sinhalese themselves are called "People of the Lion" or the "Lion
Race". The Sri Lankan national flag bears a sword-bearing lion, which is a replica of
the one used by Kandy, the last Sinhalese kingdom to fall to the British
colonialists......When Tamil nationalism reached warring proportions it had an
appropriate counter symbol-the roaring tiger, which was used by the most martial
Tamil dynasty in India, the Cholas. Today, the Sri Lankan army has regiments called
Sinha, or lion, and its adversary, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
popularly known as Tamil Tigers, have leopards, panthers and cheetahs in their ranks.
See D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Lions and Tigers, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Apr. 1999, available at http://
www.himalmag.com/99Apr/lionstigersl.htm.
I am particularly fond of the usage of this phrase by Arundhati Roy in one of her
speeches, and I quote from her writing here:
To call someone anti-American, indeed, to be anti-American, is not just racist, it's a
failure of the imagination. An inability to see the world in terms other than those that
the establishment has set out for you: If you don't love us, you hate us. If you're not
good, you're evil. If you're not with us, you're with the terrorists.

7

See Arundhati Roy, Not Again, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 30, 2002, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/sep/30/usa.iraq.
The answer to this and other mysteries concerning Sindbad's adventures in Serendib
may never be known. What is significant is that the island figures prominently in the
Sindbad tales, and that it is portrayed as a storybook kingdom governed by a wise
ruler, a place where the magical and the miraculous are commonplace. For Serendib
was regarded as not only a centre of early trade, but also as an enchanted island
abounding in wisdom and majesty.
See Richard Boyle, Sindbad in Serendib, 17

SERENDIB MAGAZINE,

koslanda.com/sindbad.htm (last visited May 13 2008).
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as well as a hopeful characterisation of lasting solutions to Sri Lanka's seemingly
intractable conflict.' What eludes serendipity and serendipitous opportunities
in Sri Lanka?
An analysis of Sri Lanka's past attempts to end the ethnic conflict is not
encouraging at all.' Brown and Ganguly have convincingly argued that it is
"important to understand the dynamics of ethnic relations, the causes of ethnic
conflicts, the processes by which ethnic conflicts become violent, and what
well-meaning leaders and governments can do about these problems.""o If a
settlement is to be found to Sri Lanka's conflict, it is important that the causes
of the conflict and the sources of its intractability be clearly ascertained,
understood, and responded to. This is one of the central aims of this paper.
Ganguly describes David Carment's comparative perspective on secessionist
ethnic conflict in South and South East Asia as a "near exhaustive review of
the state-of-the-art scholarly literature on the aetiology of ethno-national

8

The essence of this characterisation has perhaps been most elegantly described by
John Ziman, who states:
The key point is that serendipity does not, of itself, produce discoveries: it produces
opportunities for making discoveries.....Even then, the perception of an anomaly is
fruitless unless it can be made the subject of deliberate research. In other words, we
are really talking about discoveries made by the exploitation of serendipitous opportunities
by persons already primed to appreciate their significance.
See JOHN ZIMAN, REAL SCIENCE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT MEANS

9

10

217 (2000).

A detailed discussion of Sri Lanka's pre-2000 attempts at peace and negotiation may
be found in NEGOTIATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: EFFORTS, FAILURES AND LESSONS
(K. Rupesinghe ed., 1998); CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: CIVIL WAR AND
RECONCILIATION (Robert Rotberg ed., 1999). Uyangoda has convincingly argued that
the shadow of that negative past is bound to be cast over new attempts at peace. See
Jayadeva Uyangoda, Civil War and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka, 18 ASIAN EXCHANGE
56 (2002).
Micheal E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly, Introduction, in GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND
ETHNIC RELATIONS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 9 (Micheal E. Brown & Sumit Ganguly
eds., 1997).
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mobilisation and ethnic secession in order to identify key structural, instrumental,
and normative factors that converge to create violent secessionist ethnic
conflicts."" Carment has dealt exhaustively with the four primary perspectives
used for explaining ethnic conflict: the primordial perspective, the instrumental
perspective, the political economy perspective, and a hybrid perspective
involving a combination of insights from these three viewpoints.' I have briefly
described the central features of each of these perspectives before detailing the
perspective and overall methodology employed by this paper.
Primordialists argue that peoples' ethnic and religious identities have deep
social, historical, and genetic foundations, and that the motivation for ethnic
and kinship affiliation comes from these subjective, psychological forces internal
to the individual and related to basic human needs for security and, more
importantly, survival. Therefore, individuals are bound to an ethnic group by
virtue of some 'absolute import attributed to the tie itself."' In other words,
primordialists consider ethnic identity and ethnic affinity as unchanging givens,
while asserting that "because of primordial affinities derived from race, skin
colour, tribe, caste, language, religion and other such factors each ethnic group
has a different historical experience and consequently its position in society is
likewise determined."' 4
The instrumentalist perspective argues that ethnic identity is manufactured
or maintained in a particular scenario as a basis for collective action. Tambiah,

"

Rajat Ganguly, Introduction: The Challenge of Ethnic Insurgency and Secession in South and
Southeast Asia, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SECESSIONISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST
AsIA 20 (Rajat Ganguly & Ian Macduff eds., 2003).

12

David Carment, Secessionist Ethnic Conflict in South and Southeast Asia: A Comparative
Perspective, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SECESSIONISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, id.
at 29-37.

13

Clifford Geertz, The Integrative Revolution: PrimordialSendments and Civil Politics in the
New States, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE: SELECTED ESSAYS 255 (1973).

14

See

ISHTIAQ AHMED, STATE, NATION AND ETHNICITY IN CONTEMPORARY SOUTH ASIA

20 (1996).
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for example, identifies a form of collective behaviour that can be related to the
wider cultural practices -and political norms and traditions of public assemblies
and protest - as one of the possible perspectives on collective violence in
situations of ethnic conflict.s An instrumental perspective would, therefore,
emphasise the political dimensions of ethnic group behaviour as a method of
protecting or furthering the interests of that ethnic group.'" Ishtiaq Ahmed, for
example, takes the view that ethnic identity
needs to be conceptualised as multidimensional, comprising 'objective
characteristics' some or all of which can be employed by a set of
individuals to mobilise those who share these characteristics for some
societal action. In other words, ethnic identity is situational, contextual
and in terms of [a] basis for collective action constructed."'

15

16

17

See STANLEY J. TAMBIAH, LEVELING CROWDS: ETHNO-NATIONALIST CONFLICTS AND
COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AsIA 221-223 (1997).
Carment points out that the term 'ethnopolitical', which signifies that group demands
have shifted from linguistic, cultural or religious interest to political, territorial, or
material appeals for self-determination, is used to refer to such group behaviour. See
Carment, supra note 12, at 31.
Pfaff-Czarnecka and Rajasingham Senanayake highlight the instrumentalist
perspective's conceptual distinction from the primordialist view by arguing that post
colonial state building "has often created the very ethnic identities, confrontations
and violence that states proclaim as ancient and then purport to control." See Joanna
Pfaff-Czarnecka & Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Introduction, in ETHNIC FUTURES
- THE STATE AND IDENTITY PoLITICS IN ASIA, slipra note 4, at 10.
See AHMED, supranote 14, at 22. Varshney, analysing the relationship between ethnic
identities and ethnic conflict or ethnic violence, states that "to move from ethnic
identities to ethnic conflict or to ethnic violence is to make an inadmissible analytical
leap." See ASHUTOSH VARSHNEY, ETHNIC CONFLICT AND CIVIL LIFE 26 (2002). Stokke
and Ryntveit argue that "nationalist mobilization cannot be reduced to essentialist
notions of primordial nations, territorial nation-states, or internal colonialism, but
instead should be understood as the outcome of cultural and political practices by a
multitude of actors, operating in time- and place-specific contexts." See Kristian Stokke
& Anne Kirsti Ryntveit, The Struggle for Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, 31 GROWTH &
CHANGE 285-304 (Spring 2000).
72
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The political economy perspective explains that ethnic mobilisation results
due to structural factors such as the relative size and location of different ethnic
groups and ethnic entrepreneurs (the elite who have a vested interest in
advancing particular agendas or promoting particular courses of action) along
with normative determinants (for example, institutionalised forms of conflict
resolution as opposed to coercive measures). This perspective therefore argues
that only after these factors have been carefully ascertained, assessed, and
balanced, can any conclusions as to the causes or occurrence of ethnic conflict
be made." Approaches that combine insights from the three perspectives outlined
above may be termed as hybrid perspectives, and these stress on political and
economic disparities (and their underlying history and causes) between the ethnic
minority and the centre-State.
In terms of methodology and approach, this paper refers to the colonial,
historical, economic, legal and international dimensions of the "ethnicisation
of politics" and the intractability of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.'9 The
overview of the Sri Lankan conflict in Part 1 of this paper places particular
emphasis on the chronological reportage of important events following the 2002
ceasefire. Similarly, emphasis is also placed on describing in detail the historical
events that have created the present context of the Sri Lankan conflict. Through
this paper, I have adopted a hybrid approach towards ethnic conflict - one that
seeks to describe the political economy of the conflict, to identify and articulate

18

See Carment, supra note 12, at 31. An interesting analysis from the political economy
perspective is found in Sunil Bastian's argument that the July 1983 riots in Sri Lanka
were closer in character to an anti-Tamil pogrom than to a communal riot, and
constituted a socio-political 'process' (whereby he traces the linkages between the
development process in Sri Lanka and ethnicity). See Sunil Bastian, PoliticalEconomy
of Ethnic Violence in Sri Lanka: The July 1983 Riots, in MIRRORS OF VIOLENCE -

ASIA 286-304 (Veena Das ed., 2d ed.
1994).
For a discussion of the phrase 'ethnicisation of politics', see Rajasingham-Senanayake,
supra note 4, at 101-102.
COMMUNITIES, RIOTS AND SURVIVORS IN SOUTH

19
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the instrumental and situational attributes thereof, and to relate the continuance
of the conflict to certain key historical, economic, legal, attitudinal and cultural
factors.
The objective of this enquiry is to identify clearly classifiable
phenomenological trends of (and prospects for) the originary complexity (in
Derridean terms) of Sri Lanka's conflict,' which will be particularly useful for
the future project of creating a robust constitutional order in a Sri Lanka of the
unfailed imagination. Written initially as an exercise in political science, this
paper works in the tradition of humanities pedagogy that, as Spivak eloquently
puts it, "attempts an uncoercive rearrangement of desire through the method
of its study."20
After a brief overview of some recent significant events marking the Sri
Lankan conflict (updated until the second week of May 2008), this paper
identifies and details two sources of intractability - the existence of fractured
fronts leading to the lack of consensus and the articulation of maximalist goals
resulting in mutual mistrust. It is argued that any solution to Sri Lanka's ethnic
conflict will have to adequately respond to these two sources in order to ensure
a lasting peace in the island in the future. Legal reform heralding the development
of a true constitutionalism in Sri Lanka must accommodate for these sources
of intractability.
Benefiting from insights from communicative theory and the deliberative
democracy discourse - articulated through this paper - I sketch the outlines of
a constitutional solution to begin surmounting these two identified sources of
intractability in the concluding section.

20

GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, OTHER ASIAS
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Map of Sri Lanka

Sourced from: http://www.intute.ac.uk/sciences/worldguide/html/1028_map.html

I.

An Overview of the Conflict
Located a few kilometres off the southern-most Indian state of Tamil Nadu,

Sri Lanka is divided into nine provinces and is approximately 65, 525 square
kilometres in size. Sri Lanka's pluralistic society of just over 21 million people
21

The Eight Schedule of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka, 1978 [Sri Lankan Constitution, 1978] lists out these provinces - Western,
Southern, Uva, Eastern, Central, Sabaragamuwa, North Western, North Central, and
Northern. These nine provinces are administratively comprised of 25 districts, 256
divisional secretariats, and 160 electorates. See Article 5, First Schedule and the Eight
Schedule of the Sri Lankan Constitution, 1978. See also http://www.priu.gov.lk/
TourCountry/Indextc.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
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is comprised of several ethnic communities with the Sinhalese (74%)
constituting the largest ethnic group. Primarily Buddhists by religion, the Sinhalese
are concentrated in the south, west, and the central parts of the country. The
Sri Lankan Tamils, the next largest ethnic group (12%), are concentrated primarily
in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The Muslims (8%) are
concentrated in the east, while the Estate Tamils (Tamils of recent Indian origin)
(5%) mainly occupy the central hills in Sri Lanka. The Malays, Burghers, Moors,
Eurasians, and Veddhas constitute the remaining 1% of the population. 22 In
terms of major religious affiliations, about 69% of the population is Sinhala
Buddhist, 15% Hindu, 8% Christian, and 7% Muslim.23
The first colonial power, Portugal, arrived in Sri Lanka in 1505. At this
time, three kingdoms existed in Sri Lanka - the kingdom of Kotte occupying
the west and the south-west, the kingdom of Kandy in the central part of the
island, and the kingdom of Jaffna in the North.' The Dutch took over in 1658.
Finally, in 1796, came the British colonisers who defeated the defiant Kandyan
kingdom in 1815. In 1832, Sri Lanka was brought under a single unified
administration and Colombo became the capital.25 Ceylon (Sri Lanka) eventually
gained independence from the British on 4' February, 1948.

22

Statistical details obtained from MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, STATISTICAL
POCKETBOOK OF THE DEMOCRATIc SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRu LANKA 9-26 (1998).
The armed conflict in Sri Lanka has aggravated the paucity of comprehensive
population statistics. Statistics from the 2001 census that covered 18 out of the 25
districts of Sri Lanka can be accessed at http://www.statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/
PopChra.asp. (last visited May 13, 2008).

23
24

25

See http://www.priu.gov.lk/TourCountry/Indextc.html (last visited May 13, 2008).
The antiquity of these kingdoms has sometimes been traced to the three kingdoms
of Ruhunu, Maya and Pihiti mentioned in the Mahavamsa (Pali for 'Great Chronicle),
a poem of great religious-historical importance to the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. See, e.g.,
Lakshman Kiriella, Kandyans Urgedfor Three Federal States in 1928 and 1948, SUNDAY
OBSERVOR, Jan. 5, 2003, available at http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2003/01/05/

fea0l.html.
See Jeyaraj, supra nOte 5.
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The Sinhalese-Tamil bipolarity, a useful analytical lens for centuries of Sri
Lanka's diachronic narratives, was soon firmly cemented in Sri Lanka's postcolonial imagination. 26 In 1972, the country's name was changed from Ceylon
to Sri Lanka and Buddhism became the nation's primary religion. With ethnic
tensions rising through the Sinhalese nation-building project, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran,
began their separatist campaign for the predominantly Tamil north and east of
Sri Lanka. The beginning of the armed conflict, as such, is traceable to the
LTTE ambush of an army convoy in 1983 (resulting in the death of thirteen
soldiers) and the reactionary anti-Tamil riots across Sri Lanka (claiming over
2500 Tamils lives).
Since 1983, the full-scale war has resulted in more than 70,000 deaths,
more than a million people fleeing abroad, and hundreds of thousands of people
being displaced internally. 7 The country has witnessed soaring inflation, stunted
economic production, and a constant loss of lucrative economic opportunities. 28
Inflation has hit a record high of 29% in 2008, and in May 2008 Standard &
Poor's downgraded Sri Lanka's debt rating.29

26

27

In a helpful overview of the modern ethnic-religious conflict in Sri Lanka, Carin
Zissis points out that "[i]n the years following independence, the Sinhalese, who
resented British favoritism toward Tamils during the colonial period, disenfranchised
Tamil migrant plantation workers from India and made Sinhala the sole official
language."See Carin Zissis, The Sri Lankan Conflict, Sept. 11, 2006, available at http://
www.cfr.org/publication/1 1407/sri_lankanconflict.html.
See Sri Lanka: Not Much to Celebrate, THE EcoNoMisT, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http:/
/www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?storyid=10656855. An evocative

depiction of the atmosphere during the war generally is contained in the novel Anil'

28

29

Ghost by Asian-Canadian novelist Micheal Ondaatje. See MICHEAL ONDAATJE, ANIL's
GHosT (2000). For an intellectual debate on the approach and perspective of Ondaatje's
book, see Qadri Ismail, A Flippant Gesture Towards Sri Lanka: A Review of Michael
Ondaafe'sAnif Ghost, Radhika Coomaraswamy, In Defenseof Humanisic Ways of Knowing:
A Reply to Qadri Ismail, both in 6.9 PRAVADA (2000).
See Sri Lanka: Not Much to Celebrate, supra note 27.
Jeremy Kahn, War is the Answer, NEWSWEEK, May 19, 2008, available at http://

wwwnewsweek.com/id/136359.
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India, Sri Lanka's nearest neighbour and an ethnic kin state for the Tamils
in Sri Lanka, has played a distinct role in the conflict - prominently, involvement
with the training of the Tamil militant forces and the introduction of the Indian
Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) into the island in 1987 (followed by its humiliating
pull-out in 1991)."o Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of India at the time of
deployment of the peacekeeping force, was killed by an LTTE suicide bomber
in 1991. Sri Lankan President Premadasa met a similar fate on 1 May 1993.
Subsequently, India distanced itself from the Sri Lankan conflict. However,
recent news reports seem to indicate an increasing cooperation (particularly
with regard to naval surveillance) between the two countries."
Sri Lanka's most recent period of relative peace was formally ushered in
on 2 2 nd February, 2002, when the two warring sides signed a ceasefire agreement
formalising the informal cessation of hostilities that had prevailed since the
LTTE's unilateral ceasefire of 25' December, 2001.32 Norway had worked with
the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to set up the Sri Lanka Monitoring
mission (SLMM) to supervise the agreement and mediate in negotiations." While
some important progress was made between February 2002 and April 2003, the
LTTE unilaterally suspended its participation in the peace talks on 2 1" April

30

Ganguly has provided a detailed comprehensive study of India's role in the ethnic
conflict in Sri Lanka. See RAJAT GANGULY, KIN STATE INTERVENTION IN ETHNIC
CONFucTs - LESSONS FROM SOUTH ASIA 193-232 (1998). India's role in the ethnic
conflict and a grim documentation of the IPKF atrocities in Sri Lanka is provided in
R. HOOLE et al., THE BROKEN PALMYRA - THE TAMIL CRISIS IN SRI LANKA: AN
INSIDE ACCOUNT (1992).

31

See, e.g., P.S. Suryanarayana, India' Naval Surveillance a Big Hep to Sti Lanka, THE
HINDU, June 4, 2008, available at http://www.thehindu.com/2008/06/04/stories/

32

33

2008060461401700.htm.
See AGREEMENT ON A CEASEFIRE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC
SocAIsT REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA AND THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM,
available at http://www.peaceinstilanks.org/insidepages/Agreement/agceasefire.asp
(last visited May 20, 2008).
The SLMM was composed of roughly sixty members from five Nordic countries
(Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) and headquartered in Colombo
with district offices in the North and East. See Zissis, supra note 26.
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2003.3" Even as the ceasefire formally remained, both sides repeatedly alleged
truce violations, with recurrent reports of skirmishes and killings." In a political
power tussle between then President Chandrika Kumaratunga [Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP)] and her bitter rival Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
[United National Party (UNP)], Kumaratunga used her sweeping powers under
the Sri Lankan Constitution to impose a state of emergency in late 2003.3

34

35

The LTTE also announced that it would not be attending the Tokyo Conference on
Reconstruction and Development of Sri Lanka held in June 2003 through this
communication. The LTTE has unilaterally rejected attempts at peace several times
in the past. Following the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987 which the LTE had
rejected, the second attempt at a negotiated solution was initiated by Sri Lanka's
President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 1989. In June 1990, the LTTE unilaterally
terminated the unofficial ceasefire. In 1994-95, the newly elected People's Alliance
(PA) government of Sri Lanka, initiated talks with the LTTE. Following six months
of talks, the peace negotiations once again collapsed following the unilateral resumption
of hostilities by the LTTE in April 1995. See Uyangoda, supra note 9, at 57.
For example, Arjuna Parakrama, in a keynote address entitled Accouningfor Peace as
Violence by Another Name: Heretical Thoughtsfrom the Margins of the Sri Lankan Ethnic

Conflict provides a chilling account of the nine-fold increase of child abductions and
disappearances relating to LTTE conscription since the signing of the MOU, of
threats to civilian populations if they reported ceasefire-related indiscretions to the
Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), and of the overall reduction of the peace
talks to a dialogue between the two perpetrators (the government and the LTTE).
Parakrama's address is discussed in Cynthia Caron, Sri Lanka - Floundering Peace
Process-Needto Widen Participation,38 ECON. & POL. WKLY 1029 (2003). The University
Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna while warning against the continued "appeasement

policy" towards the LTTE provide detailed documentary evidence of the LTE's
continued abuse of civilians, it's killing of political opponents, violence against Muslims,
conscription of children, etc. and the destabilising effects of the same on Sri Lankan
society. See UTHR(J), SPECIAL REPORT No. 17 - REWARDING TYRANNY: UNDERMINING
THE DEMOCRATIC POTENTIAL FOR PEACE (2003), available at http://www.uthr.org/
SpecialReports/spreportl7.htm (last visited May 14, 2008).
36

See Emergency Declared in Sri Lanka, CNN, Nov. 5, 2003, available at http://

www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/south/I 1/05/slanka.firing/index.html.
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Two unpredicted events in 2004 further accelerated the island's hurtle
towards all-out military war. First, in the first week of March 2004, a split within
the LTTE high command surfaced. Colonel Karuna Amman, former eastern
commander of the LTTE, broke away from the mainstream LTE while claiming
that the interests of the Eastern Tamils were being ignored." Karuna's 'Tamil
Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal' (TMVP) faction was thus born. The armed faction
of the TMVP began (and continues) to fight the LTTE alongside the Sri Lankan
government (though the government has repeatedly denied any direct connection
to Karuna)." Following Karuna's defection, Sri Lanka's witnessed some intense
internal fighting. In April 2004, the LTTE attacked and defeated Karuna's eastern

37

38

In a stunning turn of events, Karuna was arrested in London on November 2, 2007
for carrying an "apparently genuine Sri Lankan diplomatic passport issued under a
false name." During the UK court case, Karuna said he had received the false
diplomatic passport from the Sri Lankan government - in particular, from the brother
of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. In May 2008, Karuna was transferred to an
immigration detention centre and it is still unclear as to whether or when he will be
deported. See Renegade Tamil Rebel Jailedin UK, BBC NEws, Jan. 25, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7209415.stm; UK Transfers Renegade Tamil
Tiger, BBC NEWs, May 9, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/
7392107.stm; Human Rights Watch, UK* Missed Chance to Charge Sri Lankan Rights
Abuser, available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/05/09/slankal 8795.htm
(last visited May 14, 2008).
For an analysis of the split within the LTTE from that time-period, see generaly Jehan
Perera, Peace Process and the LTTE Split, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Mar.-Apr. 2004, available
at http://www.himalmag.com/2004/march-april/commentary_1.htm.
Like all armed groups operating in Sri Lanka, the Karuna faction has also been
repeatedly accused of human rights violations (often with claims of state complicity).
"Despite ongoing international scrutiny and criticism, including from the United
Nations, the Karuna group has continued to abduct and forcibly recruit children and
young men for use as soldiers, with state complicity." See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
REPORT VOLUME 19, No. 11(C), RETURN TO WAR: HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE
(2007). See also UTHR(U), SPECIAL REPORT No. 18 - POLITICAL KILLINGS AND SRI
LANKA's STALLED PEACE (2005), available at http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/
spreportl8.htm (last visited May 14, 2008).
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forces in a fierce battle at the Veragul River near Batticaloa and Trincomalee
districts." While Karuna went into hiding following the defeat of his forces,
most observers agree that the split had profoundly altered the political and
military situation in the east.' More violence soon followed. On 7' July 2004,
a suicide bomber killed herself and four policemen in Kollupitiya police station
in the heart of Colombo in an attack almost certainly targeted at Douglas
Devananda (leader of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP), which has
fought alongside the army against the LTTE). It was the first such distinctively
LTTE style suicide bombing since October 2001. The 2002 ceasefire was still
in force on paper, but clearly, the momentum towards war was building.
Second, Sri Lanka was battered by a massive tsunami on 26' December
2004, leaving close to 40,000 people dead and many more homeless. Post-tsunami
reconstruction resulted in renewed and increased hostilities between the Sri
Lankan government and the LTTE.41 On 12 th August 2005, Lakshman
Kadirgamar, Sri Lanka's Jaffna-born, Tamil Christian, Oxford-educated Foreign
Minister, was shot to death by one or more unidentified gunmen in Colombo.
The LTTE, which had come in for harsh criticism throughout Kadirgamar's

39

See

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT VOL.

SOLDIERS AND THE
40

See HUMAN

TAMIL

16, No. 13(C),

TIGERS IN SRI LANKA

RIGHTS WATCH,

LIVING IN FEAR: CHILD

(2004).

supra note 37.

Rodd McGibbon provides for an interesting account of how the tsunami had different
effects on the long-running disputes in Aceh and Sri Lanka. He points out that by the
end of 2005, Aceh had witnessed a successful process of arms decommissioning,
the withdrawal of non-local security forces, and the promulgation of a new law
allowing for self-government in Aceh. See Rodd McGibbon, Tranforming Separatist
Conflict, 7 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 121 (2006). Michael Renner points out that the posttsunami reconstruction in Sri Lanka has been highly uneven (and often terribly

inadequate) even as of January 2008 and links this diagnosis with the exacerbation
of the conflict. See Michael Renner, Conflict in Sri Lanka Slows Tsunami Rebuilding,
available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5576 (last visited May 14, 2008)
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distinguished international career, is widely believed to have been behind the
assassination. 42 A state of emergency was, once again, declared in Sri Lanka
soon after. During 2005, the government enacted emergency regulations three
times: twice following the December 2004 tsunami, and once following the
killing of Lakshman Kadirgamar.4 These emergency regulations inter alia
permitted arrests without warrant as well as non-accountable detentions for up
to 12 months.
In the close November 2005 presidential poll that marked the end of
Kumaratunga's tenure, Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP) prevailed over his main rival
Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP). As part of his campaign, Rajapakse had forged
electoral pacts with the hardline Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)
and Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU)." Zissis points out that "[i]n a move some
experts regard as part of an LTTE plan to restart the war, the Tigers had prevented
voting by Tamils, who would most likely have cast ballots for the moderate
Wickremasinghe, in the north and east areas under LTTE control."45 In the
immediate aftermath of Rajapaksa's victory, more than 200 people (including
military personnel, LTTE cadre and civilians) were killed in a series of bombings
and clashes that 'had all the hallmarks of an undeclared war." The level of

42

"Kadirgamar had been instrumental in getting the Tigers outlawed as a terrorist
organisation by the US and Britain and had known he was a target for a long time.

He was protected by more than a hundred soldiers all the time." See Jason Burke &

43

44

Santush Fernando, Assassination Leads to State of Emergency in Sri Lanka, THE OBSERVER,
Aug. 14, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/14/srilanka.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, SRI LANKA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTIcEs - 2005, Mar. 8, 2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/
2005/61711.htm.
Sanjana Hattotuwa states that this "draconian government with scant regard for

human rights uses the continuing intransigence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam as an excuse to clamp down on civil society, NGOs and the media." See
Sanjana Hattotuwa, Denial and Polaritadon, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Feb. 2007, available at
http://www.himalmag.com/2007/february/opinion.htm.
4
46

See Zissis, supra note 26.
Wije Dias, Despite Peace Talks, Sri Lanka Drifts Towards Civil War, available at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2006/apr2006/sril-aOl.shtml (last visited May 13,2008).
82

Sarendib's Sorrow

violence declined only in February 2006 when the Sri Lankan government and
the LTTE met in Geneva (under Norwegian facilitation) and reaffirmed their
commitment to respect and uphold the ceasefire agreement.4 7 The sincerity of
the commitment was belied in the coming months however: even as the LTTE
postponed the second round of talks in Geneva - bombings, killings and combat
on land and in the seas regularly continued in March and April of 2006.
April marks a particularly significant month in our analysis of the return to
all-out war in Sri Lanka. On April 11 ', a claymore anti-personnel mine attack
(attributed to the LTTE) killed 10 Sri Lankan navy sailors. The next day, a cycle
of largely anti-Tamil violence in Trincomalee (called Thrikanaamale in Sinhala
and Thirukonamalai in Tamil) began, eventually resulting in more than 35 deaths
and 60 injuries. Jeyaraj points out that "[t]he seriousness of the situation saw
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressing concern to Sri Lankan
President Mahinda Rajapakse over the telephone, and evoked stark memories
of the July 1983 anti-Tamil violence on the island." 48
On April 20, 2006, the LTTE officially pulled out of peace talks
indefinitely. A few days later, on April 25, 2006, the LTTE carried out a truly
daring attack in the heart of Colombo - a female suicide bomber (who might
have been pregnant) blew herself up in the army hospital inside the heavily
guarded army headquarters. The main target of the attack -Lieutenant General
Sarath Fonseka - survived despite suffering serious injuries.49 Soon after the
suicide bombing, the Sri Lankan army launched aerial attacks on L=E positions
in the North-East for the first time since the 2002 ceasefire. In effect, the fullscale war had begun once again.

47

See The Government of Sti Lanka and the Liberation Tigers Issue Statement, available at

48

http://www.norway.org.uk/policy/news/srilankatalks.htm (last visited May 13,2008).
D.B.S. Jeyaraj, Again, in Trincomalee, HWAL SOUTHASIAN, May 2006, available at http:/
/www.himalmag.com/2006/may/analysis_1.html.

49

See Bomb Targets Sri Lanka Army Chief BBC NEWs, availableat http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/south asia/4941744.stm (last visited May 13, 2008).
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Near the end of May 2006, the European Union listed the LTTE as a
banned organisation.so The last few days of April, and the months of May and
June 2006 also saw extremely intensive fighting and unprecedented levels of
violence.' The situation reached a critical point in July, when the army launched
an offensive to gain access to a waterway (Mavil Aru) in disputed territory
around the eastern town of Muttur in Trincomalee district." The fighting over
the water reservoir ended with the Sri Lankan army obtaining control of the
area in mid August 2006. This military victory, it is suggested, would set the
tone for much of what was to follow in the military arena over the next twenty
months of a full-scale war.53
On May 11, 2008, Sri Lankan president Rajapaksa hailed his party's
controversial election victory in the country's tense Eastern Province (in alliance
with Karuna's political party) as a mandate to push ahead with his war against

50

51

52

5

Amit Baruah, European Union Bans LTTE,

May 31, 2006, available at
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/05/31 /stories/2006053117200100.htm.
See Sri Lanka GeneralKilledin Blast, BBC NEWs, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/southasia/5115968.strn (last visited May 13, 2008); Shimali Senanayake, SW Lanka
jets Bomb Tamil Rebels' Airstri, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, June 16, 2006,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/16/news/srilanka.php; S iLankan
Combatants Rape Women to TerroriZe, THE SOUTHASIAN, June 18, 2006, available at bttp:/
/www.thesouthasian.org/archives/2006/srjiankan combatantsrape-wom.html.
See generally UTHR(J), SPECIAL REPORT No. 22 - HUBRIS AND HUMANITARIAN
CATASTROPHE (2006), availableathttp://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/spreport22.htm
(last visited May 13, 2008). On 5 August 2006, 17 aid workers belonging to French
NGO, Action Contre la Faim (Action Against Hunger, ACF) were massacred at Muttur
in an incident that shocked the international community. The SLMM has attributed
responsibility for these deaths to the Sri Lankan government. See B. Muralidhar
Reddy, Awy BebindAid Workers'Massacre:SIfM, THE HINDU, Aug. 31, 2006, available
at http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/31/stories/2006083107821400.htm.
On January 2, 2008, the Sri Lankan government officially pulled out of the ceasefire
agreement. The Norwegian mediators are no longer involved in peace negotiations
in Sri Lanka.

84

THE HINDU,

Sarendib's Sorrow

Tamil Tiger rebels in the north." Rajapaksa has promised to destroy the LTTE
by the end of 2008 - he has already doubled the defense budget to $1.5 billion
(about 5.8 percent of the Sri Lankan GDP) and he has clearly given his military
commanders a free hand.ss In sharp contrast to the military stalemate that has
characterised most of the history of the ethnic-religious conflict, the Sri Lankan
military appears to be clearly winning (in terms of territorial gains and losses
inflicted) this time around." Also in mid-May 2008, the Government of India
extended its ban on the LTTE as an unlawful association for two more years.5"
The signals are clear: if the standard assumptions remain unchanged over the
coming days - the intense war looks set to go on, at the very least, until the end
of 2008.
As the war goes on, the citizens of Sri Lanka will have to indefinitely
continue to live in conditions of abject non-democracy, caught between an
54

"1 note that the people of the east have given a clear mandate for peace through the
defeat of terrorism, the strengthening of democracy and the development of the
country." See N. Manoharan, Eastern Provindal Coundl Elecions: A First Step Towards

5
56

Final Settlement?, available at http://www.ipcs.org/SouthAsiaarticles2.
jsp?action=showView&kValue=2586&country= 1016&status=article&mod=a (last
visited May 20, 2008).
See Kahn, supra note 29.
Kahn's (May 2008) analysis of the Sri Lankan government's military strategy is worth
quoting at length here:
The Army's accomplishments over the past 18 months certainly are
impressive. It has managed to wrest control of seven of the island's districts
from the Tigers, leaving the guerrillas with just two [in the North]. The Sri
Lankan Navy has bested the L'ITE's Sea Tiger light attack-boats in several
critical engagements and has sunk a number of their floating offshore
arms depots. Sri Lanka's Air Force has killed two high-ranking Tiger leaders
[SP Thamilselvam and Colonel Charles] in the past six months. And the
government says it only narrowly missed killing Velupillai Prabhakaran,
the Tigers' elusive commander and founder, in a December air raid.
Meanwhile, crackdowns on the LTTE's financing and arms networks by
the United States, the European Union, India and Australia have hampered
the Tigers' ability to raise funds and smuggle in weapons.
See id.

*

L'TTE Still Uses Tamil Nadu as Supply Base, THE HINDU, May 16, 2008, available at

http://www.thehindu.com/2008/05/16/stories/2008051661321200.htm.
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authoritarian government in military overdrive and a deadly terrorist force
without remorse. One is then forced to ask - what could dramatically alter our
assumptions in this scenario? Three immediate possibilities come to mind: the
assassination of Rajapaksa, the assassination or capture of Prabhakaran, and
finally, a visionary commitment to peace expressed through a serendipitous trustgenerative mechanism. If this third possibility is to emerge, it is crucial that the
sources of intractability of the ethnic conflict are identified and responded to.
It is to this aspect that we turn next.

II. Sources of Intractability

A. FracturedFronts:A Deficit of Consensus
The first major source of the intractability of the Sri Lankan conflict is the
deficit of a genuine consensus regarding trust-generative mechanisms and
processes for peace, which is largely due to the multiple fractured fronts along
the political spectrum as exacerbated by the ideologies and positions adopted
by the Sri Lankan military, the LTTE, and the Buddhist clergy. The apparent
inability to reach a consensus on Sri Lanka's future contributes to an increasing
sense of apathy and frustration amongst the Sri Lankan citizenry as the conflict
continues interminably.
The history of consensus in Sri Lanka's sharply competitive and multiparty political system is not at all encouraging." In the past, even when the
58

Schaffer provides an interesting account of the tragic-comical political events from
a few years back when then President Kumaratunga belonged to one party while

Prime Minister Wickremasinghe belonged to the opposing 'other' and accurately
predicted that "their clashing personalities and political agendas will make it very
difficult for them to work together." See Teresita C. Schaffer, Sri Lanka: "Cohabitation"
- Opportunity or Paralysis,41 SOUTH AsIA MONrroR, Jan. 1, 2002, available at http://
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam4l.pdf. See also VS. Sambandan, A PoliticalSpat,
20 FRONTLINE, May 24 - June 06, 2003, available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/
fline/fl201 1/stories/20030606006613200.htm; Chandrika Warns RanilAgainstFirting
with LTTE, THE TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 9, 2003, available at http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll/articleshow?artid=7203234.
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British government brokered an agreement between the SLFP and the UNP to
work together to resolve the country's ethnic conflict, no joint work between
these two parties resulted." Weisberg and Hicks point out that the SLFP and
the UNP have doggedly scored political points off each other in the context of
ethnic tensions and nationalist sentiment for several decades now.60 The UNP,
which was at the fore-front of the formalisation of the 2002 ceasefire, has a
dismal record of torpedoing all pro-peace political settlements during the SLFP
government's reign.6' The withdrawal of the SLFP-led government from the
'UNP's 2002 ceasefire' in early January 2008 marks yet another bittersweet
cyclical reversal involving actors who seem to thwart each other's peace-brokering
legacies to the fullest extent.
Government-Opposition cooperation in the context of peace processes
remains of vital importance, quite simply, because any genuine political
settlement will need far-reaching constitutional amendments that require a
political consensus to be effectuated. Further, any changes that emerge from a
successful negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict will have to receive
political legitimacy through the support of the major political parties.
There is often no consensus on power-sharing measures even within the
same party. For example, the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, which contained
moderate proposals on decentralisation of power and concessions on the language

5

60

61

See William Weisberg & Donna Hicks, Overcoming Obstacles to Peace: An Examination of
Third-PartyProcesses, in CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA: CIVIL WAR AND RECONCLIATION,
supra note 9, at 144.
Two further impediments to a negotiated settlement are identified as a lack of attention
to underlying needs/fears and psychological barriers. See id. at 143-156.
Uyangoda points out that Ranil Wickremasinghe, then the Leader of the Opposition,
ensured the ultimate collapse of the SLFP government's peace project by not
supporting Kumaratunga's constitutional reform initiative. See Uyangoda, supra note
9, at 60.
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policy, was according to then Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake due to strong
internal divisions within the ruling party.6 2
Significantly, the political theatre also showcases several other smaller but
highly influential political parties." These parties further fracture the political
fronts and make it even more difficult to reach a consensus on crucial issues.
The Jathika Hela Urumaya GHU), for example, represents strongly pro-Sinhalese
nationalist interests. Nationalist political parties have repeatedly denounced the
Norwegian led mediation process in the past. They remain particularly well
placed to foment extremist nationalist sentiment in the rural parts of the country
where they retain most of their support." The visibility and influence of the Sri
Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) has also been steadily increasing over the past
decade..5

62

See DUDLEY SENANAYAKE

- CHELVANAYAKAM PACT OF

1965, available at http://

www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/Agreement/Dudley.asp

(last visited May 20,

2008)

See also K.

63

LOGANATHAN, SRI LANKA: LOST OPPORTUNITIES - PAST ATTEMPTS AT
RESOLVING ETHNIC CONFLICT 31-42 (1996). See also A.J. WILSON, S.J.V. CHELVANAYAKAM
AND THE CRISIS OF SRI LANKAN TAMIL NATIONALISM, 1947-1977: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 105 (1994).
It is reported that 1,342 candidates belonging to 18 political parties and 56 independent
groups contested the May 2008 elections in the Eastern Province. See Overall 55%-

60% Voter Turnout in Violence-free Eastern PC Poll,available at http://www.defence.lk/
64

new.asp?fname=20080511_01 (last visited May 13, 2008).
The JVP's hardline stance, its continuous campaign for non-negotiation with the

LTTE, and its rejection of the 2002 peace process and the Norwegian mediation
have had a significant effect on how public money has been spent in Sri Lanka since
2004 (going into 2009) and on the current strategy of all out military engagement

65

with the LITE. See general/y Peter Chalk, The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency
in Sri Lanka, in ETHNIC CONFLICT AND SECESSIONISM IN SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA,
supra note 11, at 155.
See also Uvais Ahmed, A Muslim Perpective, in NEGOTIATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA:
EFFORTS, FAILURES AND LESSONs, supra note 9.
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The LTTE has been extremely successful in systematically winning over,
cajoling, coercing, or exterminating its political opponents within the Tamil
community to be the de facto 'sole representative' of the Tamil people in the
past.6 As a result, political parties representing the LTTE have usually been the
only political representatives that Sri Lanka's Tamils have had access to. Sri
Lanka's 'bi-polar ethnic imagination' has, for long, had the LTTE appropriate
the 'Tamil' signifier in the political and negotiation realms. 7 Karuna's TMVP
party, which experienced recent electoral success in the Eastern province, claims
to espouse the cause of the eastern Tamils. In effect, Karuna's TMVP represents
the creation of a second front within the Tamil political spectrum. It is extremely
unlikely that the TMVP and the LTTE-backed political parties will agree to
cooperate on any political measures - this again illustrates the difficulties with
obtaining consensus in the Sri Lankan context.
Perera points out that the lack of party consensus (embodied in the subtle
manner of constitutional foot-dragging that has thwarted many an attempt at
peace in Sri Lanka) illustrates that the competitive rivalry of the political system
often jettisons the imperatives of peace.6 Trust, sadly enough, is and has been

66

The aspirations of many of Sri Lanka's Tamil people do not coincide with the views
and objectives of the LTTE. The LTTE's predominant role in political negotiations
over the years owes largely to the fact that the LTTE has successfully taken on the
Sri Lankan government militarily for over two decades while silencing all (or almost
all) other political voices within the Tamil community. It must be pointed out that
some small paramilitary Tamil political parties (like the EPDP) have continued to
operate over the years despite the silencing brutality of LTTE violence.

67

68

A bi-polar ethnic imagination refers to the configuration of ethnic identity politics in
Sri Lanka that constructs Sinhalas and Tamils as mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive of the island's diverse and hybrid comminities. See Rajasingham-Senanayake,
supra note 4, at 101.
Jehan Perera, The Inevitabilipt of Violence: The CentralisedState in a PluralSodey, in SRI
LANKA AT CROSSROADS - DILEMMAS AND PRoSPEcTS AFTER 50 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

86 (S.T. Hettige & Markus Mayer eds., 2000).
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in serious short supply in Sri Lanka's public and political climate. 9 In an interesting
recent piece aimed at applying insights from communicative theory and
deliberative democracy frameworks to nations of linguistic multiculturalism,
Professor Addis comments on trust thus:
For a deliberative process to function properly and effectively there
has to be trust among citizens. The notion of trust here refers to the
confidence that citizens or groups of citizens have that other citizens
or groups of citizens will treat them reasonably well, that they "will
not waylay or cheat" them, that they will be forthcoming in exchanges
with them, and that they will consider them as partners in a common
enterprise of building a community.7 0
The strongly nationalist influence of Sri Lanka's powerful Buddhist clergy
represents another serious impediment to consensus. Hattotuwa, while
commenting on the powerful influence of the Buddhist clergy on Sri Lankan
political life, points out that in 1951 the resolutions of the All Ceylon Buddhist
Congress to the Prime Minister included a statement that "the.. .government is
legally and morally bound to protect and maintain Buddhism and Buddhist
institutions." The same resolution also demanded the restoration of Buddhism
to "the paramount position of prestige which rightfully belongs to it.""

69

7o

Philip Pettit is right in describing trust as "a precious if fragile commodity in social
and political life [that] institutional policy makers and designers ignore...at their peril."
See Philip Pettit, The Cunning of Trust, 24 PHL. & PUB. AFF. 204 (1995).
Adeno Addis, ConstitutionaliingDeliberative Democracy in Multilingual Societies, 25
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 117 (2007). On the framework of deliberative democracy,

Cohen and Sabel have pointed out: "At the heart of the deliberative conception of
democracy is the view that collective decision-making is to proceed deliberatively by citizens advancing proposals and defending them with considerations that others,
who are themselves free and equal, can acknowledge as reasons." See Joshua Cohen
n

& Charles Sabel, Directy-DeliberadvePolyarhy, 3 EUR. L.J. 327 (1997).
Sanjana Hattotuwa, Overview of the Peace Process in Sri Lanka: 2002 - 2003, available at
http://www.cpalanka.org/research-papers/overvievpeace-process_2002_200 3 .pdf
(last visited May 15, 2008).
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Reiterating that all governments in Sri Lanka have jockeyed to favour Sinhala
Buddhists following independence, Hattotuwa concludes that the parochial,
hegemonic Sinhala-Buddhist mentality, which has significantly influenced postindependence politics in Sri Lanka, has indeed "engendered intolerance in polity
and society and carries a large burden of responsibility for the current ethnopolitic conflict."72 One striking illustration is the scuttling of one of the first
attempts at decentralisation of power in Sri Lanka, the BandaranaikeChelvanayakam Pact of 1957, which gave substantial autonomy to the Tamil
areas through the establishment of Regional Councils of limited power, by the
powerful Buddhist clergy working with the opposition parties."
Chandra R. de Silva points out that until early 2002 the Buddhist clergy in
Sri Lanka were firm that there should not be any talks with the LTTE (which
they viewed as a terrorist organisation) and that the solution to the civil conflict
was simply the eradication of terrorism. However, by mid 2002, the UNP
"seemed to have succeeded in persuading the [Buddhist] mahanayakas that its
negotiations with the LTTE were on the basis of a single country and thereforth,
the mahanayakas have remained united in support of the peace process."7 4 The
Schmittian framework of single nation/single sovereignty has for long been
non-negotiable for the Buddhist clergy. The breakdown of the 2002 ceasefire
agreement and the present situation of all-out war against the LITE, therefore,
sit comfortably with what has been the strategy of choice for the Buddhist
clergy in Sri Lanka.
72

Id. On the attitude of the Buddhist clergy towards the civil conflict in Sri Lanka and
their influence in peace processes, see generally H.L. SENEVIRATNE, THE WORK OF
KINGS: THE NEW BUDDHISM IN SRI LANKA (1999); STANLEY TAMBIAH, BUDDHISM
BETRAYED? RELIGION, POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN SRI LANKA (1992).

7

See BANDARANAIKE-CHELVANAYAKAM PACT OF 1957, available at http://www.
peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/Agreement/Ban.asp
See also LOGANATHAN, supra note 62, at 16-31, 86.

74

(last visited May 20, 2008).

Chandra R. de Silva also explains why the Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka has historically
reacted to devolution with caution and fear. See Chandra R. de Silva, Categories,
Identity and Dfference: Buddhist Monks (bbikkus) and Peace in Sri Lanka, available at

http://www. lines-magazine.org/Art-May03/desilva.htm#_ednrefl7 (last visited May
20, 2008).
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The Sri Lankan military has also often been responsible for fracturing propeace consensus in the Sri Lankan "state" front. Uyangoda asserts that the military
process has assumed a considerable measure of autonomy from the political
process, and can often exert considerable influence on the political process."
The existence of a massively influential military-industrial complex for which
the continuation of the conflict is essential in terms of ideology, survival, and
profit is a strong influence that detracts from consensus.
The conflicting aims of the different political parties, the anti-concession
and anti-compromise stance of the Sinhala Buddhist clergy, the posturing of
the military in Sri Lanka - these factors sustain truly fractured fronts and thereby
undermine the viability of attempts at peace in Sri Lanka. Perera suggests that
a bipartisan or multi-partisan consensus within the government and the
opposition (in effect, the political spectrum) on the core principles on which a
political solution to the ethnic conflict could be negotiated should initially be
obtained to ensure that the search for a political solution is freed from the
imperatives of petty party politics." If we may dwell on Perera's useful suggestion,
communicative theory discourse provides some important insights into the
manner in which consensus may be facilitated in Sri Lanka.

7

Jayadeva Uyangoda, A Political Culture of Coqflict, in CREATING PEACE IN SRI LANKA:
CIVIL WAR AND RECONCILIATION, supra note 9, at 160.
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Weisberg and Hicks point out that the military is a strong influence promoting continued
armed conflict since military leaders have an obligation to their constituents that
requires them to be able to justify to soldiers and their families that blood was not
spilled in vain. See Weisberg & Hicks, supra note 59, at 144. What will soldiers, arms

manufacturers, terrorists, and the vultures do in a situation of peace? Solutions are
not inconceivable - soldier rehabilitation (along with victim rehabilitation) in post-

war Mozambique, for example, represents one such concrete vision of a post-war
unfailed imagination. I am grateful to my colleague Rodrigo Pagani D'Souza for
bringing this to my attention.
77

See Perera, sipra note 68, at 86-87.
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A truly genuine consensus requires that voices be heard - it requires
dialogue." Habermas' sage injunction of dialogue, or discourse, being central to the

processof deliberativedemocray rings true stridently for Sri Lanka." Only, if subaltern
voices are indeed voiced and heard - and their influence felt through dialogue will it be possible to generate consensus in Sri Lanka to make possible, to use
Spivak's words, "the promise of a conversation, on other Africas, on the way to
the globe othered, again and again, from capital to social, through a pedagogy
of genealogical deconstruction reterritorialising the abstractions of an antiethnicist regionalism" of the unfailed imagination.
One of the main challenges for reformative enquiry in the Sri Lankan
context, therefore, will be in designing an institutional, legal and public sphere
where the President and the Prime Minister, and all the major political parties,
will find it possible (and based on reason) to agree to cooperate in the effective
pursuit of a sustained peace. Given the rather restrained natural proclivity for
such cooperation in the past, the creation of such a public sphere should be the
task/burden of a constitutional framework of the unfailed imagination.
The' public sphere as such is "a theatre ... in which political participation is
enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate
about their common affairs ... an institutionalised arena of discursive
interaction."" Constitutions are particularly suited to limit/define the range of
78

"There has been an important shift in contemporary democratic theory from 'votecentric' to 'talk-centric' theories of democracy." See Alan Patten & Will Kynlicka,
Introduction: Language Rights and Political Theory: Context, Issues and Approaches, in
LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND POUTICAL THEORY 16 (Will Kymlicka & Alan Patten eds.,

2003).
79
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See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NoRMs: CONTRIBUTION TO-A
DIscouRsE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996). Seyla
Benhabib points out: "Legitimacy in complex democratic societies must be thought
to result from the free and unconstrained public deliberation of all about matters of
common concern." See Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic
Legitimag, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE
POLITICAL 68 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
NANCY FRASER, JUSTICE INTERRUPTUS: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE "POSTSOCIALIST"
CONDITION 70 (1997).
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options and actions available to players in a given scenario and one finds a
paradigm example in the post-war German Constitution. The forms available
to Sri Lanka's future constitutional frameworks are multifaceted - it is only
within the public sphere of a deliberative democratic framework that these
constitutional contours can (and indeed will) be precisely articulated."1
An institutional design fostering trust, promoting dialogue, and changing
the subalternising modes of production of voice is critical for a vibrant
serendipitous Sri Lanka. Constitutions provide normative charters for such
consensus-generating enterprises. Modern technologies such as radio, television,
and the Internet provide the enabling tools. Given the small territorial size of
Sri Lanka, it is almost absurd to note the absence of a robust semiotic democracy
of radio-generated voices of political opinion. Serendipitous activity, however,
as Merton and Barber remind us, requires both 'deliberate' action and persons
capable of appreciating serendipitous opportunities.82 Sri Lanka, it seems, has
long been waiting for the princes of Sarendib.
Facilitating the continued opening up of political spaces, of the public
sphere, in the North (and indeed in all of Sri Lanka) is vital. Ensuring that the
multitude of voices (a true polyphony in Bakhtinian terms) critical of the status
quo in Sti Lanka's constitutionalmilieu - indeed critical of claims of the inevitability

for Sarendib's continuing sorrow - are voiced, heard, considered, and acted
upon, is absolutely crucial." The grotesque narrative of fractured fronts that

81

The idea of deliberative democracy rests on the foundation of Habermas' notion of
a "public sphere." See generaly JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

82
83

OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIs SOCIETY
(Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., 1989); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACrIoN: LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST
REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).
See generaly MERTON & BARBER, supra note 1.
"[A] sort of transnational literacy, an intuition of the dynamic geopolitical
configurations of the globalising present, may be achieved, again and again, providing
a changeful and moving base for the recording of the ceaseless movement of data
as such." See SPIVAK, supra note 20, at 227.
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obscures the path to the eternal 'carnival' of Sarendib/Sri Lanka needs to be
transformed and consensus must be pursued and generated."

B. MaximalistGoals:A Surplus ofMistrust
The core of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka may be simplistically reduced
to the desire of the Sinhalese Buddhist majority that Sri Lankan state sovereignty
is not compromised pitted against the Tamils' desire to ensure that their right to
nationhood is respected. The vocabulary of this exquisite conflict results in
two architectonic (as distinguished from compositional or teleological)
consequences:
First, the articulation of objectives/goals in maximalist terms of
one undivided sovereign country (the statist goal) or complete
liberation/independence from an oppressor (separatist goal).
Second, mistrust for any strategic moves at variance with claimed,
or attributed, ideological maximalist goals.

A battle of great antiquity
...antiquity itself did not know the antiquity that we know now. There
used to be a school joke: the ancient Greeks did not know the main
thing about themselves, that they were ancient Greeks...But in fact
the temporal distance that transformed the Greeks into ancient
Greeks...was filled with increasing discoveries of new semantic values

84

"[A]ll were considered equal during carnival. Here, in the town square, a special
form of free and familiar contact reigned among people who were usually divided
by the barriers of caste, property, profession, and age..." Bakhtin illuminatingly
developed the concept of 'carnival' to describe Dostoevsky's polyphonic style of
writing. In Bakhtin's theory, the carnival creates the "threshold" situations where
regular conventions are altered or broken, and genuine dialogue becomes possible.
See generally M.M. BAKHTIN, PROBLEMS OF DosToEvsKY's PoETIcs (Caryl Emerson
trans. & ed., 1984).
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in antiquity, values of which the Greeks were in fact unaware, although
they themselves created them.
-

Mikhail Bakhtin"

Ahmed points out that the Theravada form of Hinayana Buddhism
prevalent in Sri Lanka and the cultural heritage of the Sri Lankan Tamils have
historically played a central role in the cultural and the ethnic identity formation
of the Sinhalese and the Tamils.16 Several scholarly studies have concluded that
the Mahavamsa does contain some elements of collective sentiment that helped
foster a 'self-other' distinction between Buddhists and Tamils in historical times.87
The existence of such historical material is often used to justify conflict, to
promote separation, and to manufacture mistrust. In Sinhalese and Tamil
mythology, and in the consciousness of many Sri Lankans, an unresolved
controversy of fact breathes malignantly: which people were the first to inhabit
Sri Lanka?
Many Sinhalese claim that they arrived on the island from northern India
as early as 500 BC under the leadership of Prince Vijaya. In response, many Sri
Lankan Tamils claim they inhabited the island long before the arrival of Vijaya.
A similar debate ensues over the superior antiquity of the respective languages
of the two groups."

Quotedfrom
Q

GARY SAUL MORSON & CARYL EMERSON, MIKHAIL BAKHTIN: CREATION
OF A PROsAIcs 290 (1991).

86

See AHMED, supra note 14, at 239. Rajasingham-Senanayake, through a brief review

of the scholarship on this issue, points out how such ethnocentric histories are a vital
part of the popular culture in Sri Lanka, and how both Tamil nationalism and Sinhala
nationalism echo the 'homeland myth.' See Rajasingharn-Senanayake, supra note 4, at
87

88

107-108.
See, e.g., Gananath Obeysekere, Sinhala Buddhist Identity in Ceylon, in ETHNIC IDENTITY:
CULTURAL CONTINUITIES AND CHANGE 395 (George De Vos & Lola Ramanucci-Ross
eds., 1975); STANLEY TAMBIAH, SnI LANKA: ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING
OF DEMOCRACY (1986).
See generaly AHMED, supra note 14, at 239. Rajasingham-Senanayake has pointed out
that the primordialist interpretation of ethnicity emphasises the existence of a perennial
conflict between the Sinhalas and the Tamils for control of the island. This conflict
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Tambiah has cogently argued for the urgent and strong need for "imaginative
and liberated non-sectarian historians" who can debunk "the idea of an age-old
and permanent confrontation between two ethnic blocks, the Sinhalas and the
Tamils."" The dialogue of a strong and vibrant public sphere, promoted and
enriched by such imaginative pedagogies, would influence a shift away from
maximalist goals. It would also engender greater trust. Most crucially, it would
allow for the serendipitous discovery of "unfinalisability" of the modern Sri
Lankan soul - one that accommodates, perhaps even demands, peace. 0

Colonial Legacies

Jayawardhana,

in a historical summary of the ethnic conflict, points out
that social and economic developments during the early colonial period under
the Portuguese and the Dutch, primarily in the form of the commercialisation
of agriculture, the registration of title to land, registration of births and deaths,
proselytisation, etc. contributed towards a freezing of ethnic boundaries between
the Sinhalese and the Tamils. 1

is exemplified by the story of the primordial feud between the two groups when the

89

90

Sinhala king Duttu Gamini fought the Tamil king Elara in the 2n century BC. See
Rajasingham-Senanayake, supra note 4, at 106.
See STANLEY TAMBIAH, SRI LANKA: ETHNIC FRATRICIDE AND THE DISMANTLING OF
DEMOCRACY 6-7 (1986).
Here, as in so many other contexts, I find it useful to quote Bakhtin:
In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who
understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative
understanding - in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really
see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or
photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only
by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because
they are others.

Quotedfrom MORSON
91

stpra note 85, at 289.
Kumari Jayawardhana, Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka and Regional Security, Oct. 1987,
available at http://www.infolanka.com/org/srilanka/issues/kumari.html.
AND EMERSON,
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Additionally, the entry into Sri Lanka of over one million Tamil workers
from South India, as plantation labor, for the coffee plantations established by
the British and the establishment and growth of educational facilities in English
in the Tamil areas, which led to large-scale employment of the Tamils in 'the
state services, the private sector and... the learned professions contributed to
the souring of the relationship between the two communities.'92 In time, the
Sinhalese bourgeoise felt the loss of employment to the educated Tamils and
the Burghers. The Sinhalese working class also had to grapple with the fact that
the South Indian Tamils had also established control over a large segment of
the employment market. This manufactured comparative advantage of
employment, and the reactions thereto, strengthened the simmering ethnic
antagonism and mutual mistrust.
Simultaneously, British colonial administrators and scholars also played an
important role in cementing Sinhala Buddhists and Tamils into separate and
insular ethnic groups. The colonial census in Sri Lanka played an important role
in the eventual consolidation of linguistic and religious categories along an ethnoracial fault line.93 Rajasingham-Senanayake explains that beginning with the
processes of translation and transformation in the colonial period, "race has
served as the root metaphor which congeals linguistic, religious and cultural
markers in the formation of the modern Sinhala-Buddhist and Tamil (ethnic)
identities." 94
In the sphere of government, racial or ethnic schemes of political
representation were pursued when including Sri Lankan natives in the governance
machinery. This phenomenon is clearly evidenced in the representations at the
92

Id.

93

See Rajasingham-Senanayake, supra note 4, at 109-114. See also C.Y Thangarajah, The
Genealogy of TamilNadonalism in Post-IndependentSri lanka,in SRI LANKA AT CROSSROADS
- DILEMMAS AND PROSPECTS AFTER 50 YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 68, at

120-122.
9

See Darini Rajasingham-Senanayake, Ideniy on the Borderline: the Colonial Census, New
Ethnicities and the Unmaking of Muldculturalism in Ethnic Violence, 3 IDENTITY, CULTURE
& POL. 39 (Dec. 2002).
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Ceylon Legislative Council in the late nineteenth century and the early-twentieth
century, and the Manning reforms of 1920." The Donoughmore Commission
(1927 - 28) which sought to suggest changes to the existing system of communal
representation, recommended universal adult franchise, which was accordingly
instituted in 1931.6 The Donoughmore reforms were vociferously opposed by
the Tamils, who in an atmosphere of increasing Sinhalese hostility, perceived
the communal representation system as a safety net against the possible tyranny
of the majority Sinhalese." The Donoughmore reforms have been called by
historians as a "political re-conquest" - resulting in the re-creation of a national
Sri Lankan identity based on a Sinhala-Buddhist heritage, in majority Sinhalese
victories in the political arena, and in rejection of representation systems for
the Tamils and other minorities." In the last two decades of Sri Lanka's colonised
history, the balance of power shifted dramatically in favour of the Sinhalese
thereby bringing along with it the high likelihood of the tyranny of the vengeful
majority and the accompanying sentiment of mistrust.
Ahmed has pointed out that the parting gift of the British, the Soulbury
Constitution, which was adopted in 1948, contained two fatal weaknesses."

9

96
9
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See Rajasingham-Senanayake, supra note 4, at 114-115.
See AHMED, supra note 14, at 243.
Selvadurai brilliantly articulates the fears and anxieties in Sri Lanka's Tamil community
during this historical period in his brilliant fictionalised account. See SHYAM SELVADURAI,
CINAMMON GARDENS (1999). Thangarajah points out that the Donoughmore reforms
also resulted in increased "elite" hostility towards the Estate Tamils - "when the
question of voting was taken up, the question of the 'labourers' who had been
brought by the British became acute." See Thangarajah,.supra note 93, at 124.
For detailed studies of this period, see Thangarajah, supra note 93; WILSoN, supra
note 62.
Lord Soulbury was the head of the Commission that drafted a new Constitution for
Sri Lanka. The Soulbury Commission arrived in Sri Lanka in 1944. The Tamils had
pleaded before the Commission for a system of 50-50 representation, but this proposal
was not supported by the Muslims who instead sought to align themselves with the
Sinhalese in national politics. Finally, the Soulbury Commission recommended a
constitution which was based essentially on a liberal notion of a multiracial secular
democracy. See AHMED, supra note 14, at 243.
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Firstly, it prescribed a unitary form of government based on the Westminster
model, which vested sovereignty in one centralised Parliament and effectively
precluded any meaningful devolution or decentralisation of power. 00 Second,
though the 1948 Constitution forbade discrimination against minorities, a clear
bill of rights defining the rights of minorities and individuals was not included. 0
It is these trust-depleting failings of the 1948 Soulbury Constitution that
Marasinghe bemoans as historical blunders to be avoided, while also asserting
that they had "planted the seeds of discord, which by 1984 had grown into a
massive communal conflagration and has enveloped the nation in its entirety
into one enormous fire ball.""o2
Familiarity with. the English language (or lack thereof) served as a
foundational identifier for many of the British policies that hardened Sri Lanka's
bipolar ethnic imagination - those who spoke English were included in the
governance structures while those who didn't were denied such opportunities.
When universal suffrage was introduced, everyone, irrespective of their
command over language(s) had equal access to the reins of governance and
political power. Soon after independence, one language - Sinhala - was given a
predominant position through the contrivances of the majority-driven political
system while Tamil and all the other non-Sinhala languages were abandoned at
the wayside. The metaphor of language, therefore, is inextricably connected
with the consolidation of bipolar ethnic identities and the perpetuation of the
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
100

101

102

Uyangoda has pointed out that the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy
introduced the Sinhalese nationalist elite to one of its existential assumptions:
"Democracy is the rule of the majority, the arithmetic or numerical majority, in this
case the collective and general will of the ethnic-religious majority." See Jayadeva
Uyangoda, A State of Desire? Some Reflections on the Unreformabiliy of Sri Lanka's PostColonial Polity, in SRI LANKA AT CROSSROADS - DILEMMAS AND PRosPECrS AFTER 50
YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 68, at 106.
See AHMED, supranote 14, at 243. See also Bastian, supranote 18, at 291, for a discussion
of the ineffectiveness and inadequacy of the minority safeguards in the 1948
Constitution.
LAKSHMAN MARASINGHE, AN OUTLINE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL SETLEMENT IN SRI
LANKA

24 (2003).
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Nationalism and Nationalisms
But it isn't necessary to be "anti-national" to be deeply suspicious of
all nationalism, to be anti-nationalism. Nationalism of one kind or
another was the cause of most of the genocide of the 20th century.
Flags are bits of coloured cloth that governments use first to shrinkwrap people's minds and then as ceremonial shrouds to bury the dead.
-

Arundhati Roy'0 3

The decades after independence in Sri Lanka saw a massive attempt at
state-building and modernisation where the Sinhala majority sought to increase
their domination over a centralised 'welfare state': the language policy of 1956,
the minority-discriminatory university admissions policies of 1970-71, land
colonisation policies, etc are examples.104 Further, under the prevalent electoral
system with its guiding logic of power in numbers - the Sinhala vote was preeminent. The two largest Sinhala parties, the UNP and the SLFP, regularly wooed
the Sinhala electorate by pursuing policies that discriminated against the
minorities.
Rajasingham-Senanayake points out that this trajectory of Sinhala
nationalism finally resulted in the unbearable political and cultural tyranny of
the Sinhala majority - with the consequent breakdown of the social contract
between the ethnic minorities and the majoritarian Sinhala state.t0 She highlights
four significant moments that "mark the rise of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism,
the marginalisation of minorities and the concomitant politicisation and
militarisation of the Tamils" in this period of democratic tyranny. o0First, the

103
104

105
106

See Roy, supra note 6.
K.M. de Silva, To Restore Peace to Sri Lanka's FracturedPoliy, available at http://
www.peaceinsrilanka.com/insidepages/background/background.asp (last visited May
15, 2008).
See Rajasingharn-Senanayake, supra note 4, at 117.

Id.
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passage of the 'Sinhala Only' Act in 1956 made the majority community's
language the only official language of the country. Challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act by the Federal Party resulted in Sinhala mob violence
against the Tamil populace continuing at sporadic intervals forzover two years.'0o
Second, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948, and the Indian and Pakistani
Residents (Citizenship) Act, 1949, effectively disenfranchised a majority of the
Indian Tamil plantation labourers. Third, the enactment of the first republican
constitution of 1972, which while ending the dominion status of Sri Lanka
entrenched the notion of a strongly unitary state. This constitutional document
also gave a pre-eminent status to the primary religion of the majority Sinhalese
- Buddhism.0 8 Finally, the widespread anti-Tamil riots of 1983 resulting in the
escalation of Tamil youth resistance to the Sri Lankan Army (especially in the
North-East of Sri Lanka). In effect, these four moments constitute the
foundations of the mutual mistrust that spawned the Sri Lankan war.
The present configuration of the majoritarian Sinhalese Sri Lankan state
owes greatly to the aggressive nation-building measures taken postindependence. Sinhalese nationalism seems to be grounded in certain basic
premises and it is these that will mark the extreme end of Sir Lanka's future
dialogic imagination in the public sphere.
First, the notion of 'our country' or Sinhaladefa, premised on the logic that
Sri Lanka is the only land in the world that the Sinhalese people, as an undistilled collective, can genuinely call home. The existence of this attitude has
a strong instrumental connexion to the existence of the state of Tamil Nadu in
southern India - a land that the 'other', i.e., the Tamils, can call home without
any significant moral, emotive or theoretical objections.

107
108

See AHMED, supra note 14, at 251.
Significantly, the Federal Party, which was by then the primary representative of the
Tamil people, did not participate in the framing of the 1972 Constitution.
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Second, the notion of rata bedeema (division of the country) which posits
that any negotiated (or compromise-based) settlement, will inevitably be a
milestone on the road to the eventual disintegration of Sri Lanka into two
nations, the Sinhala nation and the Tamil nation. Whenever representatives of
the Tamils have urged for power-sharing in federalist terms, Sinhala nationalism
responded by equating power-sharing to national separation or to a sequential
move towards eventual separation.' This characterisation grew in part due to
fears and anxieties of a pan-Tamil nation comprising the territorial areas of
Tamil Nadu and Eelam. The suggestions for territory-based autonomy for areas
with concentrations of Tamil speaking people were constantly denounced (and,
of course, unilaterally rejected) as efforts to divide the country."0
Third, the 'minority complex' of the numerically dominant Sinhalese
community, when the Tamils of Sri Lanka and the Tamil populace of
neighbouring India are considered together as one ethnic group."' This minority
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"

My references to the Tamil aspirations for federal solutions and power-sharing are
to the Tamil parliamentarians in Sri Lanka that dominated Tamil politics from the
mid-1950s until almost 1980. This elite led nation-building endeavour that originated
from the Colombo Tamils must be distinguished from the militant Tamil separatist
nationalism that emerged in the late 1970s and has since dominated (and currently
seeks to hegemonise) Tamil politics. This latter nationalism had at its helm middleclass and dissatisfied Tamil youth. It is submitted that the needs. and aspirations of
both of these Tamil nationalisms have always been viewed upon with suspicion (and
have been branded as attempts to divide Sri Lanka) by the Sinhalese nationalists. See
Stokke & Ryntveit, supra note 17, at 294-298.
Uyangoda points out that the development of a discursive exclusivity separating the
Tamil nationalism from the Sinhala nationalism was so pronounced post-independence
that the nationalist political reasoning among Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic ideologies
occurred at two different domains, thereby negating the political space for any
possibility of the two projects to negotiate and come to an accommodation. See
Uyangoda, supra note 75, at 109.
The topsy-turvy phenomenon of numerically dominant ethnic communities
manifesting minority-like anxieties about technically minority groups is considered as
one of the paradoxes of state-building in South Asia and is also evident in the rise of
the Hindutva movement in India and Bhumiputraism in Malaysia. See Pfaff-Czarnecka

& Rajasingham-Senanayake, supra note 16, at 13.
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complex must be analysed in the context of nationalist Sinhalese realisation of
the strong likelihood that the Tamils of Sri Lanka would bear a grudge for
decades of step-sisterly treatment, in their own country, at the hands of the majority
Sinhalas. 12
Finally, the strong desire/weakness to experience 'Sri Lanka in its entirety'
before any irremediable measure that precludes this possibility manifests itself."
These arguments are strongly constitutive of Sinhala nationalism arguments which a reason-valuing dialogic public sphere of a Sri Lanka of the
unfailed imagination will encounter, must reason against, and should eventually
debunk, dispel, or accommodate for."' The acknowledgement of these features
as facets of Sinhalese nationalism has sometimes been used as a perverse
legitimisation of the LTTE's terrorist activities. The rationale underlying such
desperate assertions being that if it were not for the LITE's actions (violent or
otherwise), the Sinhala majority would never treat the Tamils as fellow citizens
worthy of respect, solidarity and dignity. This, once again, highlights the critical
need to integrate trust as a compositional value into the intellectual, moral,
legal and political discourses of Sri Lanka.
Radhika Coomaraswamy points out that in response to the rise of Sinhala
chauvinism, the process of negative dialectic resulted in the emergence of Tamil
chauvinism and extreme forms of mythmaking (including assertions that Tamils

112

Additionally, there exists the constant worry that India's Tamil population also bears
a grudge against the Sinhalese for the 'shabby' treatment of their ethnic kin in Sri
Lanka.

113
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I refer to the desire of experiencing Sri Lanka as a country free of colonial overlordship and separatist conflict. Of course, such a desire does not acknowledge the
existence of the needs, values and aspirations of minorities who have been historically
marginalised and have had their voices silenced for decades.
For example, H.L. de Silva, considered to be one of Sri Lanka's constitutional experts,

compares a federal power sharing solution to a 'beguiling serpent' that would bring
about the 'death of the Republic.' See H.L. de Silva, Federalism is a Beguiling Serpent,
July 28, 2003, available at http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?artid=9514&catid=79.
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are pure Dravidian by race, that they are the true heirs to the grand Mohenjadaro
and Harappa civilisations of India, that they are the original inhabitants of Sri
Lanka, that Tamil in its purest forms is spoken only in Sri Lanka and that the
"Saiva Siddhanta" form of Hinduism has 'a special homeland' in Sri Lanka.)."'
The extreme dialogic view offered by the current configuration of Tamil
nationalism needs to be contextualised by a wariness, and in some cases an
absolute unwillingness, to return to scenarios of actual, potential or perceived
'weakness' or vulnerability. A deliberative democracy with a robust public sphere
easily dispels such anxieties by prioritising the value of reason (the dignity or
equality or humanity of all people of Sri Lanka being examples of such reasonbased assertions) and by generating and justifying trust.
Finally, Tamil nationalism, coming from the 'paradigm of outsider politics,'
has been historically victim to well-documented unilateral rejections of its powersharing aspirations."' Tamil nationalism is therefore highly influenced by the
idea that the Tamils have a 'legitimate' or at least 'fair' right/justification/
entitlement to unilaterally reject peace-generative schemes of the Sinhalese
majority state. Such an attitude promotes mistrust and serves as an impediment
to all genuine and meaningful attempts at resolving the ethnic crisis. The
deliberative democracy model of the public sphere - with its emphasis on
dialogue and on the reasons that propagate viewpoints - effectively negates the
negative consequences of such 'legitimate' grievances while simultaneously
fostering trust in the possibility of a genuine legitimate solution.
The nationalism based temporal-normative attitudes toward responsibility
and entitlement for the events of Sri Lanka's violent past (which share the
constitutive form of Bakhtin's notion of 'chronotope) are likely to raise some

"s

Radhika Coomaraswany, Myths Without Conscience:Tamil andSinbaleseNationalistWritings
of 1980's, in FACETS OF ETHNICITY IN St LANKA 79 (C. Abeysekere & N. Gunasinghe
eds., 1987).

"1

See Uyangoda, supra note 75, at 110.
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truly difficult normative questions on Sri Lanka's path to peace. While this
aspect cannot be addressed in much detail here, I raise some questions as worthy
of future projects of enquiry. Will the (future) public sphere of Sri Lanka throw
out a sequential path to justice with abatement of violence as the first (and/or
only) prerogative? What notion of responsibility, of accountability, and of justice,
will guide the new peaceful polity's treatment of past wrongs? What will history
contribute to the sense of self and morality of the newly equal citizens of a
post-conflict Sri Lanka of the unfailed imagination?

Concluding Remarks
"However sympathetic the intention, to rob the mother-tongue of
the subaltern by way of an ignorant authoritative definition that is
already becoming part of the accepted benevolent lexicography is a
most profound silencing."
- Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak"'

Clearly, there is a long way to go before Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict is
successfully resolved. The existence of multiply fractured fronts impedes any
consensus towards peace while mutual mistrust doggedly prevails on account
of the maximalist goals usually articulated in the political and ideological spheres.
The combination of a transformative outlook with a critical self-analysis will
prove to be particularly useful, especially so during this current phase of all-out
war."8 This paper adopts the trope of a "Sri Lanka of the unfailed imagination"
to renew again the possibilities of serendipity and peace in Sri Lanka. After all,
serendipity was/is an "attribute" of Sri Lanka, was/is it not?"'
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See SPIVAK, supra note 20, at 96.

11S See Thushara Hewage & Ahilan Kadirgamar, Critical Thinking in Wartime,

HIMAL

SOUTHASIAN, June 2008, available at http://www.himalmag.com/2008/june/

analysis 2.html,
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"Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem
essentiam constituens," translated as, 'by attribute I understand what the intellect
perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence." See SPINOZA, Ethics, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF SPINOZA 408 (Edwin Curley trans. & ed., 1985).
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In many ways, a deliberative democracy framework (benefitting from insights
from communicative theory) offers great hope and great opportunity for Sri
Lanka. The contours of this deliberative democracy model will, indeed must,
be enshrined in reformative enquiry and the future constitutional texts of Sri
Lanka. Deliberative democracy would also require - in the fashion of iteration
of South Africa's most recent constitution - a genuine commitment to, and a
highly effective institutional design for, public-participation in the constitutionmaking process. The medium of radio communication (buttressed by direct
consultations, television, and Internet) could provide for a particularly effective
means to fashion a robust public sphere for reasoned dialogue in Sri Lanka.
Deliberative democracy in Sri Lanka will also have to fashion for itself a new
brand of trust - involving each individual's trust in her or his fellow citizens,
and peoples' trust in the values of ethics and reasoned moral and philosophical

viewpoints. 12 0
While most Sri Lanka analysts seem content to predict that the war will go
on in the coming months, the methodology of this paper is geared towards a
different conclusion - the coming months in Sri Lanka offer more, much more,
than merely the possibility of military success against the LTTE or the
inevitability of the LTTE's retaliatory terror-strikes. The current juncture, more
than any other in Sri Lanka's troubled past over the past 50 years, seems poised
for what Bruce Ackerman would describe as a genuine consitutionalmoment.' 2'
Political scientists would describe such a moment in terms of a notable juncture
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Some virtuous flavours characterised by writers in the tradition of philosophical,
theological and spiritual enquiry include - for example - care [Heidegger], good will
[Kant], truth [Plato, Gandhi], justice [Aristotle], reason and tolerance [Locke, Buddha],
piety [Spinoza], humility [Buddha], restraint [Tolstoy, Gandhi], gratitude [Spinoza],
intergenerational equity [Weber, Burke], equal concern [Dworkin], fairness [Rawls]
etc.
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991). See generaly Bruce Ackerman, The
Holmes Lectures: The Liing Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1737 (2007). See also BRUCE
ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATIACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF
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for critical realignment theory. Bakhtin, I imagine, would say that the 'carnival'
is coming to Sarendib. Horace/Kant's injunction of sapere aude notwithstanding,
I venture no comments on the exact timing or contours of this imminent
constitutional moment. What I will comment upon is that Sri Lanka's move
(gradual or revolutionary) to serendipity will require dialogue, which in turn,
will require communication. Language - the most vibrant and common medium
of communication - therefore, may well be the destined arena for the invocation
of critical realignment in Sri Lanka.
I mentioned earlier in this paper that my approach belongs to a perspective
of the pedagogy of the humanities and adopts Spivak's approach towards an
uncoercive rearrangementof desires. Before I end, however, I take up cudgels as a
lawyer, if ever so briefly. We return to the metaphor of language and its symbolism
for the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka.
Article 18 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri
Lanka of 1978 begins:
18. Official Language.
(1) The Offiial Language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala.
(2) Tamil shall also be an official language...... [emphasis mine]
Significantly, Article 9 of the Constitution states:
9. Buddhism.
The Republic of Sri Lanka shall give to Buddhism the foremost place and
accordingly it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the
Buddha Sasana, while assuring to all religions the rights granted by
Articles 10 and 14(1)(e)." [emphasis mine]
Article 18 read with Article 9 of the Sri Lankan Constitution effectively
create a hierarchy of language (apart from religion) in Sri Lanka's constitutional
milieu. Robert Cover has pointed out that the state (usually through courts but
also through constitutions) imposes a singularity of 'unified meaning' on the
multiplicity of lawmaking that occurs when individuals live within self-conscious
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paideic communities that are inevitably 'jurisgenerative.' Cover argues that when
the state acts in an imperialist and 'jurispathic' fashion, it should do so only
because of a profound imperative:
However, the Sri Lankan state (and this is reflected in the LTTE's
'Tamil-only' policy in areas under its de facto command in the North)
cannot claim any such profound imperative for the discriminatory
language policy enshrined in the 1978 Constitution.122
The symbolic and jurispathic inferences of Article 18 read with Article 9
of the Sri Lankan Constitution are self-evident. In light of the bitter history of
Sri Lanka's conflict as outlined in this paper (reflected historically through the
bipolar metaphors of the Sinhala and Tamil languages in Sri Lanka's past), I
submit that a constitutional language policy enshrining such a hierarchy is unjust,
unconstitutional, and simply not permissible. This argument and conclusion
hold trueI believe, whether we apply constitutional notions of fairness, equality,
justice, humanity, dignity, etc. or whether we meaningfully consider the
commitments that Sri Lanka is obligated to discharge by virtue of belonging to
the international community of civilised nations. Recognising the obscene nature
and undertones of such a constitutional language policy (particularly in light of
the long history of discriminatory language policies in Sri Lanka) represents the
first move towards overcoming Sarendib's continuing sorrow and creating a
peaceful Sri Lanka of the unfailed imagination.
The deliberative democracy framework provides useful conceptual
solutions, and we quote Addis in conclusion:
Thus, if deliberative democracy is to work, it has to do so in the
context of multiple publics and multiple public spheres. 123
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See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narraive,
97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983). See also Judith Resnik, Paideic Communiies, Courts, and
Robert Cover (An Essay on Radal Segregation at Bob Jones Univerdiy, PatilinealMembershp
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